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ABSTRACT 
 
GLOBALIZATION OF THE  
KOREAN AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY 
 
By 
 
ISLAMOGLU, Nazim Emre 
 
 
The objective of this thesis is to understand the trends that changed the automotive 
industry for the last few years and to analyze how Korean automakers expanded their 
operations overseas.  
 
Overall automotive industry has been experiencing drastic changes recently. Supply 
chains, marketing strategies, production process and materials have been redesigned 
including new technologies of the digital age. There has also been extensive 
restructuring of the industry as firms reorganized to have greater presence and larger 
product portfolio in each of the three major producing areas.  
 
 Among Korean automakers, Hyundai Motor Company showed a great performance 
for the last two or three years. While all industry was under recession, Hyundai made 
great even in the hardest markets. The company has set out a new corporate goal: 
sales of 1 million cars and trucks a year by 2010. To reach this goal, company started 
enormous globalization efforts and among these efforts, new production facility in 
Alabama, U.S. is expected to be the most remarkable one. This new factory may help 
the company grab a bigger share from the world’s biggest auto market after 
production starts in 2005. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background and Objective of the Thesis 
 
Although automobile can be considered a "global" product, the regionalization 
in this industry corresponds to the competitive need to respond to consumer tastes, to 
conform with different government regulations, and to provide high quality marketing 
and after sales service.  
 
During the last decade, trends in the industry changed a lot. Acquisition of 
smaller, specialist automobile firms; formation of minority shareholdings and joint 
ventures have all been part of global strategies which have improved the relative 
position of major assemblers.  
 
Hyundai Motor Company has a relatively short background in automotive 
industry compared to those in the United States or Japan. The company began to enter 
true volume production in the mid-1980s, driven by exports to North 
America.  However, they have recognized that market differs there than the one at 
home. Perceived quality problems quickly dampened demand in the important U.S. 
market, however, and the company spent the next ten years fighting its way back. 
With the 1997 Asian currency crisis, pressure to consolidate Korea’s auto industry 
became acute, leaving only a single, truly independent domestic OEM – Hyundai – 
left standing today. There is no doubt that Hyundai Motor Company is one of the most 
interesting automaker of the past few years. The company has been doing much better 
than the industry average both in sales and profitability. 
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The objective of this study is to analyze the recent trends in the automobile 
industry and globalization efforts of the Korean automobile industry. In this study, we 
also tried to give a closer look to Hyundai Motor Company’s overseas efforts 
selecting U.S. as sample market. 
 
1.2 Scope of the Thesis 
 
This thesis studies the globalization process of the automobile industry and 
focuses on the Korean automobile industry. In chapter two, the globalization rends of 
the world automotive industry reviewed. The future direction of the industry and the 
need to the globalization is explained. Chapter three focuses on the history of the 
Korean automobile industry. This part analyzes how the auto industry in Korea 
developed so rapidly. The export strategies of the Korean companies are also 
discussed in this part. Chapter four is a case study of Hyundai Motor America. This 
part involves the history and growth strategies of the company, focusing mainly on 
Hyundai Motor America. Finally, in the conclusion part, the main findings and 
implications are discussed.   
 
1.3 Methodology of the Thesis 
 
This study depends largely on literature research and reports on the industry 
and companies as well. In addition, the interviews with the relevant managers of the 
Hyundai Motor Company for the case study were very helpful. The recent data and 
information were obtained through the recent industry magazines, annual reports and 
related Internet sites.  
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2. GLOBALIZATION TRENDS 
 
Today automobile industry is at the stage of economic evolution with the 
globalization of capital, communications, economic policy, trade policy, human 
resources, marketing, advertising and brands. There are Germans and Japanese 
producing cars in the United States, and Koreans producing cars in Eastern Europe, 
and Malaysia exporting cars and parts. In addition to that the automotive industry is 
now becoming not just a hardware-driven industry but an electronics-driven industry. 
It is becoming more and more a business that requires huge investments in technology 
and intellectual capital. So there's no choice about globalization anymore. Companies 
cannot just remain a national company or a regional company. Some of the companies 
are still trying to keep being local. Their strategy is doing well in their domestic 
market and selling a little bit in the others. That might not be a bad strategy for a short 
time or for a certain type of company, but for a company who wants to be a global 
player that is a hot viable alternative. The days of looking across town and seeing the 
major competitors are gone. Today auto companies around the world have ambitions, 
and some of them are world-class players-Toyota and Honda, for example. Besides, 
U.S companies are facing competitors with whom they have no experience. So the 
industry is now experiencing an incredible challenge today: more markets open for 
business, more competitors fighting for dominance, more need for very smart people 
and fresh ideas. And at the same time, they have to grow. They don't make money by 
downsizing or shutting plants or reducing their product line. They make money by 
building the company. It is more essential to the automobile manufacturers to make 
plans and build strategies, in order to achieve their goals.   
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The changes in the world economic landscape, particularly the globalization of 
markets, are creating new challenges for internationally operating companies. Taking 
advantage of this trend, the leading automotive manufacturers are increasingly 
building development and production activities in the local markets. However, this 
expansion of production capacity will only fuel the already intense competitive 
pressure. Companies looking to maintain, or expand, their market position must renew 
their product line-up at even shorter intervals, as well as continuously improve their 
cost structures. 
 
In this chapter, we are going to look at the main challenges of today’s auto 
industry deeper. 
 
2.1 Overcapacity 
 
Like all global industries, the automotive sector is facing a number of 
challenges at present. First of all, the sector is currently suffering from an enormous 
over-capacity problem. Figures show that if automotive production continues to grow 
at the same pace, manufacturers will have the capacity to produce twice as many cars 
as needed by the year 2005. 
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Excess capacity is simply a threat for both the short and long term. Excess 
capacity destabilizes markets, which leads to tighter margins and depressed returns, 
which causes increased competitive intensity at all levels and a need for new markets, 
which of course in turn results in more excess capacity. 
 
Capacity investment soared during the 1990’s, expanding 30% between 1990 
and 1998 and adding 17 million new units-the equivalent of adding a new North 
America. Capacity growth will slow, from the 90’s average annual rate of 3.4% to an 
annual rate of 1.4% between 1998 and 2006. But that will still add 8.7 million new 
units or the equivalent of two South Americas.1       
                                                          
1 PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, AUTOFACTS Early Warning Report. November 1999, p.12. 
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Excess capacity is a structural problem of long standing, the consequence of 
build-where-you-sell policies (designed to diffuse trade fiction and gain market 
access) and unrealistic conquest and export targets. While annual output grows from 
52 million units in 1998 to 62 million by 2006, manufacturing capacity surpasses over 
83 million by 2006. Therefore, global excess capacity will remain above 20 million 
through 2005-equivalents to 100 assembly plants-even if no global cyclical downturn 
is factored in. Of all the global markets, the Asia-Pacific region has the most over-
capacity.2 
 
It is important to remember that excess capacity affects not only vehicle 
manufacturers. Manufacturers’ globalization strategies are forcing parallel supplier 
investments, so problems cascade through the supply chain, with negative impact on 
shareholder value across the entire industry. 
 
2.2 Fierce Competition 
 
In addition to the over-capacity problem, the automotive industry is also 
extremely competitive. There is increased competition in all the major automotive 
markets throughout the world. The world’s car makers are increasingly competing 
against each other in all major regions, in all major product lines and at all price 
points. The US and Europe are mature markets for the automotive firms and they are 
fighting for market share and margins - and this is being felt right through the supplier 
chain. The industry is facing a number of opportunities and risks and vehicle 
manufacturers are supposed to consider everything: expand into new markets, 
                                                          
2 PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, AUTOFACTS Early Warning Report. November 1999, p.12. 
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rationalize production, build where it sells, reduce platforms, build vehicles for new 
segments, get bigger and become more nimble. 
 
Due to consolidation in the automotive industry, the number of automobile 
manufacturers has more than halved over the last 30 years. Today there are fewer than 
20 independent manufacturers and this process will continue in the years to come.  
 
2.3 Growing Markets 
 
In spite of the over-capacity and the severe competition in the industry, 
automotive production is expected to grow even faster, increasing 20% between 1998 
and 2006, versus a 13% increase between 1990 and 1998. Annual global output will 
grow from 52 million units in 1998 to top 60 million by 2004 and 62 million by 2006. 
The growth will vary from region to region, from a low of 5-10% for mature markets, 
characterized by replacement demand, to 30-60% in emerging markets, with plenty of 
new demand.3 
 
Asia-Pacific is expected to be the fastest growing market. By 2002, the Asian 
markets have recovered from their extended auto recession and reach pre-crisis 
production and demand levels. Asia-Pacific is large, yet since most of it (excluding 
Japan & Australia) remains an emerging market; it will be the dominant automotive 
market. 
 
North America & Western Europe are large and mature. They will still 
contribute a large share of growth, but achieve low annualized growth rates-about 1%.   
                                                          
3 PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP. Automotive Industry – 2001 in Review. p.5. 
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  Eastern Europe represents 16% of global growth versus 7% of global 
volume, contributing more than either North America or Western Europe. 
 
South America represents 9% of global growth between 1998 and 2006 versus 
less than 5% of global volume.4 
 
2.4 Global Presence 
 
There is strong pressure for the world’s major automotive manufacturers to 
move out of mature markets and build a global presence. They need presence both in 
mature and emerging markets. Mature markets, where economies of scale are more 
readily available, offer short-term cost/profit improvements-or would, if competition 
didn’t narrow margins. The developing world, with higher volume growth potential, 
offers greater long-term returns-against a background rich in potential economic and 
political stability. Accommodating both types of markets means differentiating 
general product styles. The emerging markets require basic transportation; mature 
markets demand vehicles offering new technology and added functions. The result is a 
complex recipe for vehicle manufacturers in the configuration of products, services 
and production capabilities for global markets. 
 
Also, as the costs increase, it makes sense for some companies to pool their 
R&D capabilities in some areas. Daimler-Benz and Hyundai, for example, will be 
working together to develop new diesel engines for trucks5. There are economies of 
                                                          
4 PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP. Automotive Industry – 2001 in Review. p.5. 
5 DaimlerChrysler and HMC Press Releases 
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scale to be gained by sharing product development costs. Cars may look different, but 
today many share identical components such as headlight bulbs. 
 
2.5 Building Global Players 
 
Companies looking to maintain, or expand, their market position must renew 
their product line-up at even shorter intervals, as well as continuously improve their 
cost structure. In order to achieve both economies of scale and potential synergies in 
the field of research and development, pressure on the manufacturers to combine into 
larger units is mounting. A similar trend can be observed in other economic sectors as 
well. Several consolidations took place in the automotive industry over the last 30 
years and the number of the manufacturers is almost halved. Today there are fewer 
than 20 independent manufacturers and the rivalry can only get fiercer with each 
mega merger - just in the past year, Daimler-Benz acquired Chrysler, Ford bought 
Volvo, and Renault took a big stake in Nissan. The industry is moving closer to the 
day when a handful of companies have the scale to squeeze purchasing and 
manufacturing costs and plow billions into new models. In the meantime, the world is 
awash with capacity: The industry can make 20 million more cars and trucks than it 
can sell. 
 
DaimlerChrysler, after the merger between German giant Daimler-Benz and 
American legend Chrysler, is considered one of the world leaders in manufacturing 
passenger cars, light trucks and commercial vehicles and trying to shape the future of 
its industries. 
2.6 Changing Customers 
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As customers become better informed, more demanding of product options 
and variety, less brand-loyal and more price sensitive, vehicle manufacturers have 
sought to expand their product range across all segments of the market, either through 
strategic alliances and merger activity or product development. The recent example is 
Daimler-Benz, moving into the small car market through the A Class and its 
involvement in the SMART car. 
 
Currently customers have more access to any kind of information, which 
absolutely increases their buying power. They compare the brands, products and since 
the switching cost is not high, may switch to another brand or product easily. In 
addition, because of the fierce competition between the manufacturers, customers are 
able to behave more price sensitive. As the technology develops, customers expect the 
products to be better and safer, dressed up with more electronic devices. And they 
want to see more technology for less money in their vehicle. 
2.7 Premium Segments 
 
Competition in the lucrative premium segment seems to heat up further. In the 
medium and long term, new growth potential has to be accessed, both regionally and 
in terms of new products and brands, particularly in volume segments. Developing 
new products for a different market segment or establishing an additional brand may, 
however, have implications for the positioning of the existing product range. New 
products for the volume markets not previously served by the manufacturers might 
have an adverse effect on the exclusive image of their brands. A move into completely 
new market segments would involve both high costs and substantial risks. An 
alternative is to co-operate with another manufacturer who already has a successful 
brand and products in place in the segments where the new company is either not yet 
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or inadequately represented. In this way, the existing product portfolio could be 
broadened without any risk to each company’s brand identity and its associations of 
exclusiveness. 
 
2.8 Environmental Concerns 
 
Environmental legislation is getting tighter and car manufacturers are now 
responsible for not only producing cars, but checking they are responsibly destroyed 
at the end of their life. Certainly, some manufacturers are beginning to produce cars, 
which will degrade in an environmentally sound way, or are made of components, 
which can possibly be recycled. In addition, the pressures of urban living may result 
in fewer cars being welcome in cities, which will affect manufacturers. Finally, the 
internal combustion engine may now have a limited life - the technology behind 
electric cars is improving rapidly.6 
 
Consumers are smart and they recognize the threat that pollution and global 
warming present to them and their children. They will gladly choose products and 
technologies that help safeguard the global environment, if those products and 
technologies are available and if they are affordable and if they perform as well as 
conventional alternatives. 
 
2.9 New Technologies 
 
Now it is "a time of new beginnings." Manufacturers are mobilizing their 
company's resources to assert leadership in new power-train technologies. Those 
                                                          
6 Mckinsey&Company. Interview with Jurgen Kluge: Automotive World in 2020. 
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technologies include electric, hybrid, and fuel cell systems, as well as innovations in 
internal combustion engines, such as direct injection.  
 
Also, Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS) could be as important as improved 
drive-train technologies in constraining automotive output of carbon dioxide and 
pollution.  
 
In the meantime, it means better routing of traffic to cut fuel consumption, 
reduce pollution, and enhance safety. According to industry analysts, intelligent 
transport could reduce traffic congestion 50% in 10 years and 80% in 20 years. That 
would help achieve huge reductions in emissions of pollutants and carbon dioxide. 
 
2.10 Industry Leaders 
 
No company can survive in a world driven by rapidly changing consumer 
needs and tastes without having leaders at every level capable of fast decision-making. 
If leaders think and move slowly or operate inefficiently-basically, if they don't keep 
up with consumers and competitors - then they won't be able to satisfy the capital 
markets' demand for both profitable growth and unassailable asset utilization. Is the 
company positioned to meet consumers' needs now and in the future? And can it meet 
those needs while bringing home great returns on the capital employed? Another point 
comes into play here, too. Increasingly, the markets value a global approach to 
business -an approach in which a company's units, divisions, teams, functions, and 
regions are all tightly integrated and synchronized across borders. 
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2.11 Information Technology 
 
Like in any other industry, auto manufacturers are studying how the information 
technology could improve their business. Electronic commerce revolutionizes the 
supply chain and triggers industry shakeout besides the challenges in production and 
processes. It allows reduction in purchasing prices and process improvements and 
thus leads to product changes. As products change new business models like modular 
vehicles or standardization are introduced. Industry experts predict that 90% of all 
future innovation in the automobile will be driven by electronics. This revolution is 
expected to take place on four levels: surge in electronics innovations in the car, 
networking and integration of electronics, networking of vehicle with environment 
and automotive embedded mobile computing7.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
7 Roland Berger & Partners. Automotive Supplier Trend Study, November 2000. 
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3. KOREAN AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY 
 
 The Korean automobile industry, now the 5th largest in the world, share much 
of the characteristics of a global industry within more advanced manufacturing 
countries such as the US, Japan and Germany. The Korean automobile industry is 
characterized by huge investment in indigenous model development and 
manufacturing facilities. This characteristic is more similar to the US, Japan and 
Germany than it is to the automobile industries of Mexico, Canada, Spain, United 
Kingdom and Thailand. The automobile manufacturers in the latter countries are 
mainly subsidiaries that are manufacturing and often just assembling from KD kits, 
models developed by the parent companies headquartered elsewhere. By contrast, the 
automobile manufacturers in Korea all have their parent headquarters within Korea 
and most of the new product development is carried out in Korea.8 
 
The history of the automotive industry in Korea starts from the mid-1960s, 
with the formation in 1965 of Shinjin Motors (later to become Daewoo). Hyundai 
started up a couple of years later, with first Kia (which absorbed Asia Motors in 1976), 
then Ssangyong, and Samsung trying to come in and stay in. The government has 
always exerted enormous influence over which groups could operate in the 
automotive industry, and over the scale of their operations. The morphology of the 
market has been the outcome of government decisions over which chaebol should be 
permitted which roles. Conflicts among the chaebol then determined the structure of 
the components business. Each vehicle manufacturer wanted its own family of 
suppliers, and business was meant to be mostly within the family. Few parts suppliers 
                                                          
8 Sung Joon Hong, “The Study of the internationalization of the Korean Automobile industry,” 
Master’s Thesis, Choong Ang University, June, 1994. 
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therefore have been partners of more than one vehicle manufacturer, although some of 
the joint ventures with leading international component companies have sold on a 
wider scale. 
 
In the same way as other countries that have entered the automotive industry, 
Korea had to draw heavily on foreign technology, training and intermediate inputs. 
For the most part Korean companies sought to keep the foreign linkages at arms’ 
length. The most important exception, lasting for 20 years, was the 1972 50:50 joint 
venture between GM and the original Shinjin Motors. Although equity was split 
equally, the Korean partner kept management control. In 1983, the company became 
Daewoo Motors. Strained relations between the partners, particularly over 
management decisions, eventually led to an acrimonious parting of the ways in 1992 
with Daewoo purchasing GM’s share. Ford did build up, via direct and indirect means 
(through Mazda, of which it owns 33%), a 16.9% share of Kia. Although the 
arrangement has brought an important (although not continuous) supply of Kia 
vehicles to the US, the American company has not had any direct voice in 
management. 
 
Even with the intensity of Korea’s effort, the automotive industry took time to 
establish itself. The first model to have assemblance of being Korean (the Hyundai 
Pony) did not come on to the market until the mid-1970s. An export effort began at 
the start of the 1980s, but still by 1990s vehicle sales abroad were under 25% of 
output. Total vehicle output per year remained under the 1million level until some 10 
years ago; FDI ventures are essentially a feature of the late 1980s-early 1990s (and 
have included spectacular failures, e.g. Hyundai in Canada). 
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The strategic aims of automotive industry policy have not altered much in the 
past three decades. Companies have focused on size, in the belief that they could 
achieve economies of scale and thus compete on price at the commodity end of the 
vehicle business. The government and companies together have pursued local content. 
To do this, two things have been necessary; the growth of parts companies to meet the 
needs of Korean vehicle manufacturers and the effort to ensure that technological 
improvements in Korea do not fall behind the rate of automotive industry 
technological progress on a global scale. 
 
Hence, both the scope and nature of the automotive industry investments have 
always been the heart of the matter. For Korean companies and the government they 
have been seen as the instruments through which unit costs should be reduced, and 
production techniques could be upgraded. But the fact that capacity growth, output 
growth and the export growth (especially at the accelerated rates of the period 1990-
96) took place with a closed domestic market became an increasing source of 
frustration. Globalization does not take kindly to strategies that want no more than 
selective contacts with external groups. It is this tension between the Korean approach 
and that of powerful international entities that accounts for the almost unprecedented 
ferocity of the present debate. 
 
3.1 Environmental Changes 
 
 Because of the enormous amount of investment in manufacturing facilities, 
experts view the efficiency scale of an automobile assembly plant to be output of 
200,000 to 300,000 cars a year. On the other hand, the huge investment in new 
product development makes the scale of economy of a platform as important as the 
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scale economy of an assembly plant. For example, Hyundai Sonata platform strives 
for about 400,000 cars a year in order to be competitive. However, the minimum 
efficient number of cars per platform differs by companies and models. In fact, many 
Japanese and European manufacturers have profitable platforms producing less than 
200, 000 cars per year. 
 
 Another consideration is the variety of consumer tastes. As Korean 
consumers become more mature consumers of automobile, they are exhibiting more 
variety-seeking behavior and demanding more models. However, more models imply 
less domestic sales per model, as more and more models compete for the same 
consumer dollars. In order to produce more models at the efficiency scale, Korean 
manufacturers have had to look to the global market for their cars. 
 
 Yet another reason for the globalization of the Korean automobile industry 
can be attributed to slower domestic growth. During the 70s and 80s, the growth of 
domestic sales averaged around 25%. This growth rate has decreased to 10-14% in the 
early 90s; in 1994 to zero; and was minus in the first quarter of 1997. Besides, many 
Koreans manufacturers have increased their capacity in order to become a global 
player. Also in 1998, the top chaebol group in Korea, Samsung, entered the market. 
For the first time in its history, Korean manufacturers were experiencing severe 
overcapacity and increasing inventory at their lots. Meanwhile labor costs in Korea 
have gone up substantially, as have input costs. 
 
 The opening up of the Korean market following WTO and Korea’s 
membership into the OECD has engendered more intense competition from foreign 
imports. In particular, most foreign automobile companies are using penetration 
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pricing strategies to gain a share of the Korean automobile market.9 Due to the 
importance of the automobile industry to a country in terms of employment and its 
effect on related industries, many governments are sensitive to trade imbalances 
arising from automobiles. Also, with the regionalization of economies through trade 
blocks Korean manufacturers are in the danger of being handicapped in their major 
export markets by both tariff and non-tariff barriers.  
 
Due to mainly these environmental changes above, the Korean automakers 
have chosen the road to globalization as a way to sustain its competitiveness. 
Globalization of Korean automakers has unfolded in the following stages:  
 
1. Exports 
2. KD exports and assembly 
3. Local manufacturing 
4. Global alliance and networking 
 
The major difference between the Korean experience and the experience of 
other countries is that the stages 2, 3 and 4 seem to have progressed concurrently. 
Like other aspects of the Korean economy, stages of globalization have seen a 
feverish pace with everything coming about within a very short period of time.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
9 Chi Sang Ji, “WTO order and the Korean Automobile Industry,” Automotive industry, December 27, 
1994. 
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3.2 History of Korean Automobile Exports 
 
The history of Korean automobile exports started in 1976 with the first 
shipment of the Hyundai Pony to Ecuador.10 Exports were possible due to the 
development of the Pony by Hyundai as an indigenous model. Prior to Pony, all the 
automobiles manufactured in Korea were KD models of Japanese and American 
manufacturers and they were manufactured purely for local consumption and 
manufacturers were prevented from exporting them.  
 
The Korean automobile industry saw strong growth between 1985 and 1988 
through aggressive export market cultivation and improved technology and 
productivity. In terms of technology, Hyundai developed its indigenous model named 
the Excel, and built the Ulsan plant with an annual capacity of 300,000 units. During 
this time, Kia, in a three-way alliance with Ford and Mazda, manufactured the Ford 
Festiva. It was developed by Mazda, manufactured by Kia and marketed by Ford.11 
 
On the marketing side, Hyundai established its own network of dealers in 
1985 and set up Hyundai Motors America. During this period, many high quality and 
reasonably priced consumer electronics and garments were being exported to North 
America from East Asian countries such as Japan, Korea and Taiwan. Hyundai rode 
this general optimism toward Asian-made products and made a strong entry into 
North America. In 1985, Hyundai Excel was the number one import vehicle in 
Canada. In the following year the Excel was broke the record for the most car sold in 
its first year of import in the US by positioning itself as an alternative to a used car. 
                                                          
10 Hyundai Motor Company Website 
11 Chu, Wujin, “Globalization of the Korean Automobile Industry”, FY’97 IMVP Working Papers, p.6 
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Between the years 1989 and 1991, Korean exports saw a dramatic decline. 
The main reason for the decline being quality problems that began to surface after the 
initial ownership period was over. In particular, North American consumers came to 
realize that the quality of Korean-made cars were not up to their expectations. One of 
the main reasons for backsliding in the quality was due to the labor unrest that broke 
out in 1989. Labor unrest resulted in poor quality levels as workers did not care about 
quality and did not make the suggestions that lead to steady improvements in quality. 
In fact, the lean production system with its high quality requires stable and cordial 
labor relations as a necessary condition. The labor management conflict at Hyundai 
began to stabilize in 1992, resulting in the improvement of IQS scores from 235 to 
193 in 1992. However, this figure has stayed constant until 1995, indicating that the 
quality problems at the Korean automakers were not all labor related.12 
 
In 1992, exports increased 13% over the previous year and started to pick up. 
In 1993, export increase was 33.9%; and in 1994, it was 13.8%. In 1994, Korean 
manufacturers exported 737,000 cars. The biggest reason for this improvement was 
due to the diversification of export markets and the high value of the yen. Market 
diversification meant lessening Korea dependence on the North American market by 
making inroads into Europe, Central and South America and India. During this period, 
Korean automakers made aggressive investment in distribution and sales. Rather than 
relying on the diligence of their partners, as was the case of OEM exports, Korean 
automakers took matters into their own hands by setting up their own distribution 
system and selling under their own marquee. 
 
3.3 Knock-Down (KD) Operations 
                                                          
12 Chu, Wujin, “Globalization of the Korean Automobile Industry”, FY’97 IMVP Working Papers, p.6 
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 The stage between exporting and local manufacturing is KD operations. KD 
operations of Korean makers started in 1989 and over a short period of 7 years, it has 
been tremendous growth. In 1993, 63,000 units were exported followed by 47,000 
units in 1994 and 88,000 units in 1995.  
 
 Kia was the first Korean manufacturer to start KD operations and mostly the 
leader. Kia started KD operations in 1987 by exporting 25,000 units to Taiwan and 
Philippines and doubled the number to 50,000 units in 1993. Daewoo was the last in 
starting KD exports. Although its slow start, throughout the years Daewoo has been 
the most aggressive Korean auto maker with ambitious plans for globalization. 
 
 KD operations were initially a way to boost exports. Many developing 
countries placed heavy tariffs on fully-assembled cars and KDs were a way to get 
around the tariff barrier. KD operations also contributed to the diversification of 
exports markets, as they went hand-in-hand with the opening up of new markets. KD 
operations also gave the impression that the automobile assembled is the local 
country’s own rather than an imported product. This breaks down consumer resistance, 
leading to increased sales and a more favorable image of the KD exporter.  
 3.4 Local Manufacturing and Global Networking  
 
 The environment for doing business in the automobile business for Korean 
manufacturers is pointing towards globalization as the only way for Korean 
automakers to survive and become one of the major players. The sharp downturns in 
domestic demand, formation of regional economic trade blocks, the need to amortize 
the huge investments in new product development, need for scale economies in 
manufacturing, changing consumer tastes, volatile foreign currency markets are all 
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pointing towards globalization as a way for the Korean automakers to sustain their 
competitiveness. 
 
 In the next chapter, we are going to take a deep look at Hyundai Motor 
Company North America operations as a case study.  
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4. HYUNDAI MOTOR AMERICA CASE STUDY 
 
Hyundai Motor Company, the biggest Korean automaker, sold its first car in 
the U.S. in 1986. At that time, few Americans had ever heard of Hyundai or its 
products. Since that time Hyundai has expanded and upgraded its product line in the 
U.S. and has gained valuable experience in the competitive U.S. automobile market. 
In 2002, Hyundai recorded an operating income ratio at 6.1% and a net profit ratio at 
5.5%, higher than Big Three (GM, Ford and DaimlerChrysler) and Toyota13.  
 
 
January-July Year to December Hyundai Motor 
2003 2002 2002 2001 (%)
Revenue (billion USD) 10.555 10.266 21.95 18.75 1.17
Op. Profit (million USD) 1,409 740.8 1,338 1,747 0.77
Op. Margin (%) 13.3 7.2 6.1 9.3 -0.34
Net Profit (mil USD) 823.7 744.5 1,203 971.2 1.24
Net Margin (%) 7.8 7.3 5.5 5.2 1.06
Sales (units) 842,994 803,342 1,719,134 1,584,488 1.08
Table: Recent Key Financials        Source: HMC Annual Reports 
 
 
During an interview in November 2002, Hyundai Motor America’s present 
CEO Finbarr O’Neil has set out a new corporate goal for the company: sales of 1 
million cars and trucks a year by 201014. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
13 Each Company’s Annual Reports 
14 Kohn, Joe, “Hyundai’s Goal is a Whopper: 1 million by ’10,” Automotive News, November 18, 2002 
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4.1 Company Background 
 
The Hyundai Motor Company was founded in 1947 as Hyundai Engineering 
and Construction Co. by Chung Ju-Yung. Hyundai Motor Co. (HMC), established in 
1967, and built its first manufacturing facility in Ulsan15. In February 1968, President 
Chung Se Yung made an agreement with Ford Motor Company of U.K for Hyundai to 
become an assembler of complete knockdown (CKD) sets of Ford Cortinas that would 
be manufactured by Ford and then shipped to Ulsan for final assembly16. Hyundai 
started to assemble 3,000 vehicles per year and within two years, production was 
increased to 5,000 cars. Soon, diesel trucks and buses were added to the product mix. 
Hyundai learnt the business from start to finish, including planning, scheduling, 
product assembly, inspection, and quality control from Ford. In 1973, the Ford-
Hyundai partnership broke up. Hyundai still required foreign support and selected a 
Japanese partner: Mitsubishi, who offered Hyundai a technical licensing agreement, 
which means that Hyundai could build its own nameplate cars using technical designs 
from Japan for everything from engines to transmissions17.  
 
Making the First Korean Car 
  By the early 1970s, Hyundai management had decided to manufacture its 
own proprietary passenger car. President Chung first hired Giorgio Giugiaro of 
ItalDesign, the car stylist for Alpha Romeo and Fiat for design assistance. Next he 
hired George Turnball, who had recently resigned as president of British Leyland over 
a policy dispute with the company’s chairman, as an HMC vice president. Turnball 
immediately hired six European chief engineers to assist him, including a body 
                                                          
15 Hyundai Motor Company Website 
16 Amsden Alice, Asia’s Next Giant. Oxford University Press, New York, NY. 1989, p.175-179.  
17 Steers, Richard M. Made in Korea. Routledge, New York NY., 1999, p.78. 
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designer, two chassis designers, two production engineers, and a test engineer. By 
learning manufacturing know-how from Japan and the UK, Hyundai was able to put 
into production its first model, the Pony. The Pony, 1.2-liter rear-wheel-drive 
subcompact of modest quality, was an immediate success in the domestic market. 
Export markets were tested during the latter 1970s and provided the company with 
early export experience.  
 
In the early 1980s, the company invested in a major expansion of its Ulsan 
plant, making a major transition from low volume to high volume manufacturing. 
Hyundai was looking for future growth. Soon, with the new capacity, HMC’s exports 
began to climb, as did local sales. In 1982, Pony II-was launched and exported as far 
as Africa, Latin America, and Canada and was well received as a modestly priced 
compact car. By 1986, HMC’s sales had risen to more than 400,000 vehicles, and 
profits began to stream in.18  
 
Global Ambitions & Restructuring  
In 1999, HMC announced its intention to join the ranks of the world’s ten 
largest carmakers by 2002 through integration of auto-related operations which now 
belong to other affiliates of Hyundai group.  
 
As a major step towards the goal, HMC merged the operations of Kia Motors, 
acquired in June 1999, with its own activities. The Kia deal made Hyundai the largest 
automaker in South Korea with a broader product line. The combined operation gave 
company not only bargaining power but important leverage to play parts suppliers 
against each other, making them compete for quality.  
                                                          
18 Hyundai Motor Company Reports 
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Next Hyundai Motor has separated itself from the Hyundai Group in 2000. 
Hyundai Motor now faces a lower risk of being burdened by financially weak group 
members and this independence of Hyundai Motor improved confidence among 
investors that management will focus on the interests of shareholders instead of those 
of the conglomerate. 
 
In June 2002, 10% shares of Hyundai Motor have been sold to 
DaimlerChrysler with the aim of building a strategic alliance. DaimlerChrysler and 
Hyundai will attempt a number of new projects under this strategic alliance including 
the development of a world car jointly with Mitsubishi Motor. The two partners have 
agreed to a variety of technology exchanges to enhance the competitiveness of 
operations, which also includes cooperation in securing parts through a global 
network and the exchange of management personnel.19 
 
Today, HMC is the 9th car producer with a global production capacity of 2.5 
million vehicles and continues to build global market share with newer, more stylish-
and higher quality-cars.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
19 Korea Automotive Research Institute. 2001 Korean Automotive Industry. KARI, Seoul, 2002, p.136. 
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Company Name Total Passenger 
Cars 
Light Commercial 
Vehicles 
General Motors 8,325,835 4,900,561 3,391,423 
Ford 6,729,499 3,606,715 3,069,594 
Toyota Group 6,626,387 5,555,111 397,602 
RenaultNissan 5,047,336 4,214,430 671,610 
Volkswagen Group 5,017,438 4,829,456 164,382 
DaimlerChrysler 4,456,325 1,998,946 2,210,157 
PSA Peugeot Citroen 3,262,146 2,894,030 368,116 
Honda 2,988,427 2,930,688 57,739 
Hyundai Group 2,641,825 2,185,002 108,312 
Fiat Group 2,190,595 1,710,439 356,352 
Table: Global Vehicle Production in 2002        Source: OICA 
 
 
In 2002, HMC sold 790,004 cars in Korea and exported another 929,130 cars 
worldwide. Cumulative HMC sales since their founding surpassed 10 million cars as 
of 1997, including 4 million exports. Cumulative exports by geographic region 
currently stand at 2.5 million cars for North America, 1.1 million for Europe; 375,000 
for Asia and the Pacific; 360,000 for the Middle East, and 330,000 for South America, 
and 110,000 for Africa. HMC has indeed become a global marketer for cars.  
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Table: Hyundai Motor Company CKD Plant Abroad     Source: HMC Website 
 
 
 
 
Selection Country Company Name Location Model 
100 % Owned India HMI Chennai Atos Prime, Verna
Turkey HAOS Izmit Verna, Grace 
China WGMC Wuhan Grace 
Joint Venture 
Malaysia INOKOM Kulim Porter 
Egypt PRIMA Cairo Accent 
Venezuela MAV Barcelona Accent 
Pakistan DFML Sujawal Porter, Atos 
Indonesia HIM Jakarta Atos, Verna, Trajet
Malaysia ORIENTAL 
HYUNDAI 
Johor Avante, EF Sonata
Taiwan CCM Keelung XG 
RCHT Rongcheng Galloper 
Technical 
Agreement 
China 
JAC HUBEI Starex 
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4.2 Entering the U.S. Market 
 
By the 1980s, Hyundai Motor Company felt it was time to enter North 
America which is the world’s largest and toughest automobile market, aiming to 
become one of the major manufacturers. From HMC’s point of view, they had 
reasonably high quality entry-level products, a well trained and inexpensive labor 
force, and the financial backing of the Korean government. Since they were not strong 
enough in marketing know-how, a North America market study began. The timing of 
market entry was ideal. U.S. economy was at the height of the cycle and car sales 
were higher than ever in 1986 by 11.4 million cars and 4.6 million trucks. At that time 
Japanese companies were scrambling for the compact market but their volume was 
well below the market demand. The U.S. companies were still focusing primarily on 
the mid-and large-sized market with an increasing production volume. There was a 
large void for the entry-level cars in the market. Thus, HMC decided to go after it. 
Target market was the first-time car buyers such as college students and young 
families, who were not able to find adequate, value-equipped cars that meet their 
needs, yet were priced within their economic means. Also used-car buyers could buy a 
simple but attractive new car for the same money they spent for used-car. For a little 
extra, they could even have an automatic transmission and air conditioning. The plan 
was undercutting Toyota Corollas, Nissan Sentras, and Mazda 323s, as well as Ford 
Escorts and capturing the market then held by the notoriously unreliable Yugo.  
 
The new Hyundai Excel was designed with the export market in mind and 
priced $4,995 well below the $6,000-plus compacts. Hyundai Motor America (HMA) 
is established in late 1985. Headquarters were opened in Garden Grove, forty miles 
south of Los Angeles in southern California. HMA hired several senior U.S. 
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executives away from their Japanese competitors to help run it. It was a chance to use 
American know-how over their Japanese rivals. Park Sung-Hak from Hyundai’s 
Canadian operations became HMA’s first president. HMA was consisting of Korean 
executives transferred in from other Hyundai companies and Americans hired in from 
outside. HMA engaged Backer, Spielvogel, & Bates, a leading American advertising 
firm, to develop a marketing campaign.20 Since Hyundai would focus its efforts on 
lower income used-car buyers, theme was “Cars That Make Sense.” Even though 
there were some quality problems like the paint, reliability and performance since 
nobody has claimed that they were selling premium cars, in the you-get-what–you-
pay-car market, the Excel was instantly recognized as a good compromise for low-end 
buyers. Besides, it came with a five-year limited warranty.  
 
Dealership 
HMA initially took a conservative approach to establishing dealerships. Since 
the Excels would be shipped through just three U.S. ports (Los Angeles, California; 
Portland, Oregon; and Jacksonville, Florida), it was important that the initial dealers 
be located near these ports. Moreover, dealers would need to have sufficient funds to 
staff and equip a full-service dealership adequately. HMC didn’t let the dealers also to 
sell any other brands. Regardless being not that easy to become a Hyundai dealer, 
expecting Hyundai to be the “next Toyota,” there were over 4,000 applicants for the 
first 75 dealerships. By 1988, the number of dealerships rose to 300, still a small 
number in comparison to their Japanese or U.S. competitors, but sufficient for 
Hyundai’s initial needs. 
 
                                                          
20 Steers, Richard M.,“Made in Korea” New York; London: Routledge, 1999, p.85. 
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Hyundai Cars in the U.S. 
The first cars arrived in the showrooms in February 1986. Hyundai Excel was 
surely successful. Sales for 1986 surpassed the initial projections and reached 168,000. 
In 1987, sales were 264,000.  
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Table: HMA Sales           Source: HMC Company Reports 
 
The Excel was rated the number one imported car for both years in sales. No 
other company in history had achieved such initial success. The key to the success 
was mainly excellent market segmentation and good management. In order to handle 
the huge car-transport ships destined for the U.S. market, HMC built a massive 
automobile storage facility and a four-ship dock adjacent to its assembly facilities in 
Ulsan, Korea. HMA dealers were invited to Ulsan on a regular basis to inspect the 
cars and advise the Koreans on how to improve them. 
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Production in North America 
In support of its successful entry into the American car market, Hyundai 
decided to build a North American assembly plant in Quebec, Canada. A huge 
package of government incentives was presented to Hyundai. In this plant, HMC was 
planning to assemble both Excels and the larger Sonata, which they hoped to sell 
eventually in the United States. This plant was to provide Hyundai with the ability to 
rapidly assemble and deliver more cars built to exacting North American standards 
than would be possible from its Ulsan factory. The plant opened its operations in 
December 1988 with a capacity of 100,000 cars per year.21 
 
Despite its initial success, HMC started heading for serious trouble by 1989. 
Inexperience and nationalism were apparently holding back Hyundai’s charge into the 
global marketplace. In an effort to incorporate more Korean made parts into the U.S. 
vehicles, HMC began dropping its European and Japanese suppliers in favor of less 
experienced Korean ones. As a result, the quality of the Excels, never outstanding, 
began to deteriorate. When the American managers complained about such issues, 
their concerns were brushed aside. HMC knew what it was doing. But the 
marketplace was telling a different story. By new entries into the subcompact, the 
stakes for quality and value were raised. Hyundai sales remained static in 1988 at 
263,000 units, below the targeted 300,000. 
 
Then, the new Sonata, Hyundai’s midsize sedan was introduced in the U.S. 
market in December 1988. However, late shipping parts to Canada caused delays in 
the assembly line. This was caused by related labor strikes that had erupted 
throughout Korea during this period. Potential customers visited empty showrooms 
                                                          
21 Steers, Richard M.,“Made in Korea” New York; London: Routledge, 1999, p.87. 
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and went away angry. When the parts finally arrived and the cars were assembled and 
shipped, they were not supported by a serious advertising campaign. Customers began 
looking elsewhere, and sales decreased. Then the United States was hit by a severe 
economic recession, and overall car sales began to decline. Despite the reasonably 
high quality ratings the car received, sales were crashed. 
 
By 1989, total Hyundai sales in the United States had dropped to 188,000 
vehicles. By 1991, total sales had dropped to 120,000 vehicles. By 1992, this figure 
had dropped again, to 77,000, with an operating loss of $140 million.22 Consumers 
began to complain more seriously about poor quality and poor resale value.23 The 
brand image of Hyundai was at the bottom of the industry. People simply pursued 
Hyundai cars “inexpensive undesirable cars for those with no alternative.” Moreover, 
dealer commitment dropped along with the sales. In most areas, lower market 
potential caused dealers to focus less on Hyundai franchise and shift their resources 
and energy to other brands. This lowered focus resulted in less qualified sales and 
service people which in return caused lower levels of customer handling, meaning 
less and less sales. In response to the declining sales, American managers proposed 
investing additional funds in rebates and advertising to recreate sales and Korean 
counterparts looked for new ways to reduce costs instead.  
 
In 1992, only 14,220 Sonatas were assembled in Canada, less than 15 percent 
of total plant capacity. In October 1994, the plant was closed.24  
 
 
                                                          
22 Hyundai Motor Company Reports 
23 Mateja, Jim, “Cartalk”, Chicago Tribune, January 19, 1992. 
24 Johnson, Richard, Automotive News, May 30, 1994. 
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Back to the Future 
Hyundai’s rush into the marketplace-perhaps before they were ready-cost 
them dearly in terms of brand image and corporate reputation. Poor quality products, 
combined with poor marketing and after-sales service, tarnished the company’s 
reputation in the U.S. marketplace for years to come.25 
 
By 1993 sales were recovered and somehow stabilized at around 100,000 
units. Hyundai cars were largely ignored by both consumers and competitors. In many 
markets Hyundai cars were even not represented. Financial services institutions were 
unwilling to finance consumer loans on Hyundai products. Prices were still lower, but 
cars were not perceived as offering value due to poor product quality. The company 
focused on improving internal efficiency to achieve profitability and offered 2 year 
free maintenance to increase fleet sales to achieve sales goals.26 However, fleet 
vehicles were returning to the market after only 3-4 months with low mileage and 
competing directly with Hyundai’s new vehicles. This low cost plus low cost of 
ownership marketing worked in 1996 and 1997 but sales were not going up despite 
the aggressive production and losses were huge by 1998 due to the decision to not to 
continue this short-term tactic. By increased car prices to offer highest customer 
rebates in the market, Hyundai was now priced near competitors and considered 
among the worst in value due to poor product quality.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
25 Amsden, Alice, “The South Korean Economy: Is Business-Led Growth Working?” in Donald Clark, 
ed., Korea Briefing, Westview, Boulder, Colo., 1992. 
26 Hyundai Motor Company Reports 
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4.3 Recovery Phase 
 
By 1999, HMA decided to focus on a new strategic direction to overcome the 
difficult market situation. The strategy was basically: “add content without increasing 
the prices, lower rebates and increase dealer incentives.” Hyundai was trying to push 
customers not to ask for discounts on cars but to shift incentive spending to pay for 
increased product content. Main challenges were consumers, who do not believe in 
Hyundai’s product quality; bleeding brand image; unfocused and unmotivated dealers; 
and almost non existing product value.  
 
Hyundai has started by launching industry-leading warranty coverage as 
proof of improved product quality in order to convince consumers that Hyundai had 
improved the quality up to satisfactory levels.27 Company also chose consistent 
marketing communications and dealer support policies focusing on positive product 
attributes instead of high rebates message for stronger price/value advantage over 
competitors. Hyundai offered volume-oriented dealer incentives and minimized 
consumer rebates. Moreover, reallocated incentives into product price/value 
improvement had renovated the brand image among customers and combining with 
dealer sales incentives, pushed dealers to focus more on Hyundai cars and future of 
the company’s operations in USA.28 As a result of these new strategies, sales began 
to grow.  
                                                          
27 Armstrong, Larry and Kerwin, Katie, “Hyundai Gets Hot,” Business Week, December 17, 2001. 
28 Hyundai Motor Company Reports 
 37
Table: Hyundai Motor U.S. Car Sales by Model            Source: PR Newswire 
 
 Fleet sales have been reduced and total incentive costs have been sharply 
decreased as product value has increased. The brand, which is still well behind the 
key competitors in terms of overall strength, also got good grades from third party 
endorsements like consumer reports and buyer profile has improved.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MODEL 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Accent 41,235 66,736 79,480 71,488 
Elantra 83,292 104,099 111,293 120,638 
Sonata 30,022 45,983 62,385 68,085 
Santa Fe - 10,332 56,017 78,279 
Coupe n.a 15,237 19,176 19,963 
XG - 2,004 17,884 16,666 
TOTAL n.a 244,392 346,235 375,119 
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Table: Brand Image / Position vs. Key Competitors  Source: Consumer Reports 
* Sales Satisfaction Index    
**Customer Satisfaction Index    
*** Long Term Quality 
 
 
Warranty costs have been declining and dealers were now profitable and they 
were eager to support HMA’s sales which have improved company’s profitability. 
Sales per dealer have improved dramatically. The percentage of dealers selling over 
25 cars per month has increased from 11% in 1998 to 51% in 2000. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ad Awareness 
Familarity 
Opinion 
Consideration 
Hyundai 
49% 
50% 
26% 
25% 
Ind.Avg
59% 
72% 
55% 
43% 
Toyota
76% 
83% 
75% 
66% 
Nissan 
55% 
69% 
58% 
40% 
Mazda 
38% 
61% 
50% 
35% 
Mitsubishi 
45% 
59% 
46% 
30% 
VW 
65% 
76% 
62% 
43% 
Ford 
84% 
91% 
56% 
54% 
Evaluation 827 843 851 829 829 834 874 824 
SSI* 106 124 118 108 115 106 119 122 
CSI** 812 837 842 815 826 804 808 812 
Quality*** 628 448 299 419 438 575 586 443 
 39
Table: Dealer Status & Sales Profile                  Source: HMC Reports 
 
HMA Alabama Plant 
In April 2002 HMC announced that it will build a plant in Alabama. The plant 
will begin production of 235,000 sedans and sport utility vehicles in 2005. Hyundai is 
planning to expand the volume to 300,000 units as its U.S. business grows. Also a 
third, higher-priced vehicle in addition to the Sonata sedan and Santa Fe SUV is 
planned to produce here. The plant will also include engine manufacturing and 
stamping facilities as well as assembly.29 As one of the most automated auto factories 
in the industry, the plant will rely on modular assembly, using about 20 key suppliers 
to construct large parts of the vehicles. How Hyundai structures its U.S. supply chain 
will be a key how the automaker hopes to produce vehicles in the United States as 
inexpensively as it does in South Korea. However, in an interview Hyundai Motor Co. 
                                                          
29 Zachary, Katherine, “Hyundai Alabama Has Engine, Stamping,” Wards Automotive Reports, April 
22, 2002. 
1998 1999 2000 7/2001 Sales/Month 
#of 
Dlrs 
%of 
Dlrs 
#of 
Dlrs 
%of 
Dlrs 
#of 
Dlrs 
%of 
Dlrs 
#of 
Dlrs 
%of
Dlrs
76+ 
41-75 
26-40 
11-25 
0-10 
2 
10 
42 
159 
254 
0% 
2% 
9% 
34% 
54% 
9 
73 
87 
198 
125 
2% 
15% 
18% 
40% 
25% 
35 
111 
123 
176 
83 
7% 
21% 
23% 
33% 
16% 
86 
146 
112 
161 
57 
15%
26%
20%
29%
10%
Total 467 492 528 562 
Sales/Dealer 195 332 463 516 
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President Kim Dong Jin stated that HMA would increase the car prices.30 The 
company is considering developing a new vehicle, designed and engineered 
specifically for U.S. consumers which will be sold at a higher price. In this regard, 
new U.S. design and engineering center, under construction in Irvine, California will 
be an important part of the Alabama project. 
 
Table: Hyundai Motor America Facilities                  Source: HMC Website 
*Hyundai Finance Co.(HMFC) serves Hyundai dealers nationwide with individual 
customer financing and dealer inventory financing.  
  
 
By this plant, Hyundai, which is one of the twenty manufacturers selling 
passenger vehicles in the US, is becoming one of the nine manufacturers producing 
vehicles in the states by 2005. Robert F. Cosmai, Hyundai America vice president-
national sales stated that the factory will also solve the inventory shortage problem 
resulting from “back-order situation,” waiting inventory from parent HMC.   This 
                                                          
30 Chappell, Lindsay, “Hyundai Sees Plant As a Ticket Uptown,” Automotive News, April 22, 2002. 
National 
Headquarters 
Fountain Valley, 
Calif. 
Also houses Western regional office, 
California Design Center, National Service 
Center and National Headquarters of 
Hyundai Motor Finance Co.* 
Parts 
Distribution 
Center 
Ontario, Calif. 
Aurora, Ill. 
 
Also houses an office complex 
Regional 
Offices 
Jamesburg, N.J. 
Lithia Springs, Ga. 
 
Also operates as a parts distribution center 
Port Facilities Portlnad, Oregon 
Los Angeles, Calif. 
Brunswick, Ga. 
Newark, N.J. 
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plant will allow U.S. operations receive the entire inventory from the plant which 
would have fueled the sales over 400,000 in 2002. As a result of this, HMA is 
planning to expand its U.S. dealer body by as much as 15%.31  
 
The forthcoming plant is also a possible springboard to launch exports into 
markets such as Latin America since Montgomery’s proximity to the port of Mobile 
was a factor in selecting the site.  
 
4.4 Challenges & Opportunities 
 
There are two ways to look at Hyundai Motor America Inc. On the one hand, 
it’s a company on a roll. With a boost from new products and one of the industry’s 
boldest warranties, its sales have grown more than 40 percent a year for three years. 
That growth has strained the ability of plants in Korea to supply it with vehicles, 
leading to a decision to build a $1 billion factory in U.S.  
 
On the other hand, Hyundai can be seen as just another middle-of-the pack 
importer with a long way to go to achieve Tier 1 status.  
 
Previous CEO Finbarr O’Neill viewed the company the second way: 
“Basically the job’s not done. There’s a long way to go for the Hyundai brand 
and for this company. We still have to build the brand to a point where it will be 
                                                          
31 Bas, Cliff, “Hyundai Says Impending Alabama Plant Will Ease Showroom Shortages,” Ward’s 
Dealer Business, August 1, 2002. 
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accepted as a Tier 1 brand. That leads to product challenges, marketing challenges, 
improvement in CSI, upgrading dealer facilities-fairly comprehensive challenges.”32 
 
The year 2002 was not a bright one for U.S. automotive industry. Sales of 
light vehicles reached a level of 16.9 million units, down 1.5 percent from 2001’s total 
of 17.1 million units.  
 
Beside the declining market conditions sales, stiff competition, and rising 
marketing costs conspired against auto companies. With the Big Three suffering 
sluggish sales and declining market share of 61.3%, imported cars accounted for a 
higher percentage in the U.S. market; increasing 6% in 2002 compared to 2001.33  
 
Among importers, Hyundai was one of the biggest car importers in the U.S. 
The company has reached a sales number of 375,119 units in 2002 by 8.3% growth.  
 
Table: Sales of Imported Cars                                Source: KAMA 
 
                                                          
32 Jordan, William, “Talk From the Top,” Automotive News, May 6, 2002. 
33 USDOC Office of Automotive Affairs. The Road Ahead for the U.S. Auto Industry, April 2002. 
Maker 1999 2000 2001 
Toyota 541,065 626,047 681,142 
Hyundai 164,190 244,391 346,235 
Honda 273,626 284,591 268,319 
Nissan 270,387 276,192 238,458 
Kia 134,594 160,606 223,721 
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This dramatic rise was attributable to decisive and aggressive marketing. 10-
year 100,000-mile warranties, increase in consumer satisfaction, improvement in 
quality, and expansion of product lineups was the heart of the campaigns.  
 
In addition to these advertising and marketing efforts, Hyundai Motor 
America had collected the benefits of the improved dealer network which enabled 
better customer service hence resulted in increased customer satisfaction and sales. 
Hyundai has 602 dealers in the United States. The company says it will expand that to 
625 to fill points in the southern and western regions. The average Hyundai dealership 
already is selling around 600 units annually. Sales per dealer have imported 
dramatically.  
 
As a result of these improvements, major US media sources are now speaking 
words of praise for Korean brands beyond simply making favorable comments, and 
they are highlighting the improved image of Hyundai.34  
 
Hyundai Motor America clearly intends to continue to improve its sales and 
profitability. However, industry analysts anticipate the market conditions to be very 
challenging over the next few years. The market is expected to grow only 1% with a 
balance of car and truck segment.35 The overall performance of the U.S. auto market 
is brisk, largely because of the generous incentives and no-interest financing, and 
these high incentives will continue as long as industry overcapacity exists.  
 
                                                          
34 Korea Automobile Manufacturers Association, 2002 Korean Automotive Industry. Seoul, 2002, 
p.150. 
35 USDOC Office of Automotive Affairs. The Road Ahead for the U.S. Auto Industry, April 2003. 
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Sales of small cars, and small SUVs are expected to grow or remain steady in 
the future, the very segments of the market in which Hyundai is strongest. To reach 
O’Neil’s corporate goal for the company: sales of 1 million cars and trucks a year by 
2010, Hyundai will need to continue to grow as much as it did in recent years and that 
would be faster than either Honda or Toyota, the only other importer makes to reach 1 
million vehicle sales annually in the United States. To Hyundai’s benefit, some of the 
industry’s bigger players have taken their eyes off the car market, which makes up 
about 80% of Hyundai’s U.S. sales.  
 
Hyundai Motor’s strategy will be maintaining significant price/value 
advantage over its competitors. Company will also work on minimizing reliance on 
rebates and fleet sales to achieve sales objectives. Sales expansion goals will focus on 
Sonata and Santa Fe models. During trying to achieve more sales, Hyundai Motor 
Company will face increased government pressure from U.S. government due to 
growing Korean sales/trade imbalance between Korea and U.S. Besides, competitor 
product improvement and cost reductions will continue to put pressure on HMA’s 
pricing and profit margins. Moreover, Hyundai is now seen as a legitimate threat, a 
second Toyota by leading manufacturers.36 As a result, competitors may develop 
strategies and models specifically intend to respond HMA’s growth progress. In this 
regard, DaimlerChrysler’s recent joint venture with Mitsubishi and Hyundai37 may be 
seen as an effort to compete Hyundai’s entry-level cars by simply teaming up with 
Hyundai. 
 
 
                                                          
36 Kohn, Joe, “Hyundai’s Goal is a Whopper: 1 million by ’10,” Automotive News, November 18, 2002 
37 Korea Automotive Research Institute. 2001 Korean Automotive Industry. Seoul, 2002, p.138. 
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5. CONCLUSION 
 
Automobile production in Korea has grown rapidly since the mid 1980s, when 
the industry began mass production and successfully entered U.S. market. In spite of 
slowdowns in 1989 and 1990, because of a drop in exports, production, fueled by 
rapidly expanding domestic demand and exports, grew at a remarkable 15 percent 
annually from 1990 to 1994. As a result, production jumped from 1.3 million in 1990 
to 2.3 million units in 1994, and the Korean automobile industry became the world’s 
fifth largest right before Canada. Korean auto manufacturers, in 1994, made 4.4 
percent of the world’s automobile production, an increase of 0.2 of a point over the 
previous year’s figure. Korean auto production capacity, which was 337,000 units in 
1984, has increased sharply over the last decade in response to booming domestic 
demand and aggressive export policies. By the end of 1994, production capacity was 
over 3 million units. 
 
In 1995, domestic automobile demand slumped and registered the first 
negative growth in 14 years. The major reason for the drop was that replacement 
demand for cars has outshined the new demand. This was a clear indication that the 
Korean auto market is reaching maturity. Hyundai sold 609,514 units in the first ten 
 46
months of 1995, up only 2.5 percent from the year before. Its market share dropped to 
48.8 percent.  
 
In 1998, like other industries, automobile industry underwent much hardship 
because of the currency crisis. Domestic demand declined to half of the previous year 
and exports did not increase as much as expected. Total automobile production was 
1.95 million units, a decline of 30.6% from the preceding year and accordingly, 
negative growth was reported for the first time in 18 years. Capacity utilization rate 
fell by just under 50%. Consequently Korean automobile production, which was 
ranked 5th in the world in 1997, fell to 7th place in 1998. Over one year period, a 
significant number of auto part companies went bankrupt. 
 
Korean auto exports had grown drastically especially in 1995. The number of 
exports soared by 884,493 units over the 1994 total. Partly related with this great 
increase, both Europe and U.S. sought to ensure that Korea’s market is fully opened 
before her exports pose a major challenge to their respective manufacturers. The 
Korean automobile market was officially opened to imports in 1987. However, 
although sales of imported cars do appear to be growing, they remain minimal. 
Whether the domestic market is sufficiently open to the imported cars had become a 
political issue in the U.S. and in the E.U. In March 1995, the European Commission 
contrasted Korea’s ambitious move into European markets to its continuing 
dominance of its own market by its own manufacturers.  
 
In October 1995, the Korean-U.S. automobile trade dispute was settled. At 
talks in Washington, Seoul made drastic concessions on its cumulative auto tax that is 
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based on engine capacity and promised an early realization of the U.S. demands for 
prime time TV commercials and foreign-owned auto financing firms.  
 
The growth of production in the industry was due to innovation in productivity 
and the improvement of labor productivity. The export oriented growth policy, which 
was also highly supported by the government and domestic rivalry was also one of the 
drivers. Most Korean companies are production oriented and follow strategies heavily 
based on achieving low production costs, mass production of standardized products is 
the predominant approach. Korean automobile manufacturers are no different: low-
cost, highly productive workers are combined with large-scale, modern facilities 
employing the best available foreign technology to yield a significant advantage.  
 
Korean companies are managed less for profitability than for growth. 
Company size is the key source of social recognition and the driving force for 
entrepreneurs. 
 
Most people agree that Korean cars are trouble-free and pleasant to drive. 
However, the thing no one would deny that is, in general, foreign cars are safer and 
designed more stylishly. 
 
Korea will be transformed into a truly open and market-based economy 
cooperating with the rest of the world very soon. Consumers’ free choice will be 
recognized and respected as the ultimate economic driving force. Only the products 
and firms that meet consumers’ expectations will survive and thrive. A consumer-
oriented market economy will flourish only if it is based on the free flow of products 
and information. 
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In Korea, the days when people were overly conscious of or hostile to those 
driving foreign cars are gone. These days, more and more often foreigner cars are 
seen on the streets or parked in the open. Luxury cars are popular not only in the 
business community but also in the society in general as well. 
 
Automakers of advanced countries are extending their global reach through 
export and other forms of overseas operations. They are becoming more active abroad 
as the domestic market is fast reaching maturity. This new business environment 
would drive carmakers to compete even harder than before. It would seem to be better, 
however, to achieve their objectives through cooperation. Especially American, 
European and Japanese companies started to work hand in hand, as competitors and 
partners, for the advancement of the automobile industry under a new environment of 
the 21st century. 
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